State of Utah vs. Clark Christopher Robinson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah vs. Clark Christopher Robinson :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark Christopher Robinson; pro se.
James M. Cope; Salt Lake County DA\'s Office; attorney for appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Robinson, No. 20070192 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/125
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20070192-CA 
vs. 
CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Propelling 
Substance or Object at a Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-102.6, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Judge, 
presiding 
Appellant 
JAMES M. COPE (0726) 
CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
#153384 DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
(ACTING IN PRO SE) Office of the District Attorney 
Utah State Penitentiary 111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 250 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Draper, UT 84020 
Attorney for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20070192-CA 
vs. 
CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Propelling 
Substance or Object at a Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-102.6, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Judge, 
presiding. 
CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, 
#153384 
(ACTING IN PROSE) 
Utah State Penitentiary 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
JAMES M. COPE (0726) 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Office of the District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Appellant Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 4 
ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 
Issue 1: Did trial court err in denying Defendant's motion at trial claiming a 
violation of his right to a speedy trial? 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FACTS 5 
II. APPELLANT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE COURT ON 
THE MERITS 7 
III. EVEN IF APPELLANT HAD PROPERLY FOLLOWED APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE, THIS APPEAL WOULD STILL FAIL ON THE MERITS; 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED BY 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY UNDER BARKER 8 
CONCLUSION 13 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 14 
ADDENDUM A 15 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 15 
Amendment VI 15 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 15 
Article I, Section 12 15 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 15 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003) 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) 4, 7, 8, 10 
State Cases 
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct.App.1996) 7 
Chenv. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 5 
State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) 10 
State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124 P.3d 235 5 
State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, 138 P.3d 97 9 
State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 108 P.3d 710 6 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065 5 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404 6 
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 128 P.3d 1179 6 
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) 9 
State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134 (Utah 1957) 9, 10 
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987) 8, 9 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) 2 
State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) 5 
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503 5 
State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 9 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 6 
State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 406 (Utah 1990) 4, 7, 10 
State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052 5 
State Statutes 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e) iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 2, 15 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) 2 
Utah Code section 76-5-102.6 ii", iv, 2 
State Rules 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) 2 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const. Amd. VI 2, 15 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12 2, 15 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20070192-CA 
vs. 
CLARK CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the conviction for Propelling Substance or Object at a 
Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-5-102.6, in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Ann Boyden, Judge, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which 
grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal cases that do not involve 
first-degree felony or capital offenses. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did trial court err in denying Defendant's motion at trial claiming a violation 
of his right to a speedy trial? 
Standard of Review: The trial court has discretion "to make reasonable 
determinations concerning the existence of good cause" excusing the failure to bring a 
charge to trial within the required time. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 
1991). However, "legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the 
statute [Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) (2003)] which grants the trial court discretion 
[must be] reviewed for correctness." Id. at 425.] 
Preservation: Appellant did not request a transcript. The record contains only 
Appellee's proposed jury instructions (R.) and the trial court's final jury instructions 
(R.). Appellant made oral motions at trial claiming the lack of a speedy trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose 
interpretation is relevant to this appeal: 
1. U.S. Const. Amd. VI. 
2. Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 12. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (2003). 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (2005). 
5. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged and convicted with Propelling Substance or Object at a 
Correctional or Peace Officer, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-5-102.6, a Class A misdemeanor. This charge was supported by the sworn 
1 The 120-day disposition rule has largely been eliminated. See 2007 Utah Laws Ch. 14 (S.B. 125). However, 
the relevant period for this case was prior to the enactment of this change. 
2 
testimony of three officers, as well as a videotape of the altercation between Appellant 
and the officers. The jury spent a mere 13 minutes deliberating before convicting 
Appellant. 
Appellant argues that the length of time between December 12, 2005 and 
February 7, 2007 violates his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 8, 2005, Appellant spat in the face of Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Deputy Wayne Wilson at the Adult Detention Center, where Dep. Wilson 
worked. Appellant's spitting was witnessed by Salt Lake City Police Department 
Detective Kim Crowley and Dep. Scott Parker, who were assisting Dep. Wilson with 
booking Appellant into jail. Moreover, the whole event was captured on video tape. 
An Information was filed on December 12, 2005 alleging the one count of 
propelling a substance at a correctional officer. On December 14, 2005 Appellant was 
arraigned and assigned a public defender. At the first pretrial hearing on January 17, 
2006, Appellant's attorney, Sharla Dunroe, requested more time to look into 
Appellant's pending felony cases in an attempt to propose a global offer. Discovery, 
including a copy of the videotape, was provided to the defense on February 10, 2006. 
At the next pretrial hearing on March 13, 2006, Appellant failed to appear. At the 
third pretrial hearing, on April 10, 2006, a trial was scheduled for June 7, 2006. Due 
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to the large number of cases set for trial on that date, Appellant's trial was bumped and 
a scheduling conference was scheduled for August 22, 2006. 
In the summer of 2006, the Salt Lake Legal Defenders ("LDA") concluded that 
Christine Seaman, and not Ms. Donroe, should handle Appellant's case. At the next 
scheduled jury trial on October 18, 2006, however, Defendant refused to work with 
Defense counsel and another trial date was set. At the final pretrial conference on 
January 8, 2007, Ms. Seaman informed the court that Appellant wished for Ms. 
Dunroe to represent him and not Ms. Seaman. Judge Boyden granted LDA's motion 
to withdraw and for Appellant to represent himself. 
On February 7, 2007, Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of his peers. 
In an oral pretrial motion, Appellant claimed his right to a speedy trial were violated. 
Judge Boyden denied the motion. While the trial lasted several hours, the jury only 
required 13 minutes to find Appellant guilty of Count I. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks to appeal his conviction by jury without following the briefing 
requirements set forth in appellate procedure. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). 
Appellant deprived the Court of an objective account of the evidence against 
Appellant at trial by not marshaling the facts in light most favorable to his conviction. 
Appellant inhibits this Court from making a decision on the merits by failing to 
adequately brief the court on the issues for appeal, depriving the Court of the best 
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argument of both adversarial parties. This in turn requires the Court to do Appellant's 
work for his, something which the Court is not usually inclined to do. 
Even if Appellant had properly followed appellate procedural requirements, his 
claims of error would still fail on the merits. Appellant mistakenly argues that he was 
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the 13 month interval between 
his initial court appearance and his conviction. 
In fact, the case law clearly states that time alone does not create a speedy trial 
violation. Rather, an appellant must prove that the delay was lengthy, the reason for 
that delay was improper, the appellant timely asserted his right, and was prejudiced by 
the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); State v. Trqfhy, 799 P.2d 704, 
406, 408-09 (Utah 1990). 
Therefore, this Court should summarily AFFIRM the trial court's conviction and 
DISMISS this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FACTS. 
Because Appellant did not meet the marshaling requirement, this Court must 
rely on the trial court's findings. "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when 
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viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, | 14, 
989 P.2d 1065 (quotations and citations omitted). "If the evidence is inadequately 
marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the 
evidence." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 19, 100 P.3d 1177. 
The marshaling requirement calls for "a party challenging factual findings to 
marshal all of the evidence and the inferences that can be made from the evidence in 
support of the findings" since "it is through this material that [appellate courts] review 
the findings." State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, f 20 n. 11, 68 P.3d 1052. 
Appellants who adequately marshal the facts " 'present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at [the hearing] which 
supports the very findings [she] resists.' " State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, ^  17, 124 P.3d 
235 (citation omitted). That is, the Appellee must play the "devil's advocate" by 
"removing] [his] own prejudices and fully embracing] the [State's] position." Chen, 
at *[f 78 (internal quotations omitted). 
"[S]imply rearguing and recharacterizing the trial court's factual findings does 
not constitute marshaling." Clark, at f^ 17. That is, when an appellant "merely recites 
his own version of the facts, and presents none of the evidence supporting the 
conviction[]," appellate courts "will not consider" the merits of Appellant's case 
further. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, If 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citing State v. 
Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah CtApp.1991)). 
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Here, Appellant offered no facts in support of his conviction. As such, this 
Court should not consider Appellant's claims of error any further and assume that all 
findings of the trial court are adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
II. APPELLANT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE COURT ON 
THE MERITS. 
Because Appellant did not properly brief the Court on claims of error, this 
Court should decline to address the claims on their merits and summarily affirm the 
jury's conviction below. A sufficiently briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). "[T]o be 
adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal analysis.' " State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 
22, 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,17, 1 P.3d 1108). 
Mere "bald citation to authority," devoid of any analysis, is not adequate. State 
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ^  31, 973 P.2d 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule 
implicitly requires a "development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. 
Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 11, 108 P.3d 710. 
The Court "may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." 
Lee, 2006 UT 5 at \ 22 (citations omitted). "This court has routinely declined to 
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consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." Burns v. 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted). 
In the case at hand, Appellant merely cities various authority, declining to link 
that authority to his claims of error. Moreover, Appellant baldly states that "the State 
has only 180 days to get a case to trial" and that "[t]he State cannot prosecute this case 
because it took more than a year to get to trial" without any citation to authority. 
(Appellant's Brief at 2). Because of the insufficient analysis, this Court should 
summarily affirm the jury's conviction in the court below. 
III. EVEN IF APPELLANT HAD PROPERLY FOLLOWED 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, THIS APPEAL WOULD STILL FAIL 
ON THE MERITS; DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY UNDER 
BARKER. 
Defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial was not violated by the 
District Attorney because the length of the delay was brief, the reason for the delay 
was proper, there is dispute as to Defendant's desire for a speedy trial, and Defendant 
was not prejudiced by the delay. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court laid out a 
four part balancing test to determine whether a given defendant's right to a speedy trial 
had been violated: "Length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530. 
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In State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), defendant was arrested on March 
2, 1988, set for trial on April 13, 1988, only to have the State dismiss the case without 
prejudice due to an unavailable key witness on April 13, 1988. Id. at 705. Trafny was 
subsequently arrested and placed in custody by federal authorities on June 6, 1988. Id. 
On June 3, 1988, Defendant was arrested by the state on the original charges and was 
convicted by a jury on November 10, 1988 (Trafny had requested a continuance on 
August 5, 1988). Id. Using the Barker balancing test for both United States and Utah 
Constitutions, the Trafney court held that Trafny's right to a speedy trial had not been 
violated. Id. at 706, 708-09. 
"Once the charges were dismissed without prejudice Trafny was a free man as 
far as the State was concerned." Id. The 42 days (March 2 to April 13) incarceration 
and the 119 days (July 13 to November 10) delay "does not rise to the level oiper se 
prejudice, nor is it presumptively prejudicial." Id. Moreover, the court held that the 
"unavailability of [a] witness is a valid reason for the State to ask for a continuance 
and a dismissal without prejudice." Id. at 707 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). "[W]e 
have not adhered... strictly to 30-day provision" of Utah Code Ann § 77-1-6. Id. at 
708. 
Utah courts "have held that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial was 
not violated even when the time between arrest and trial was in excess of 30 days." Id. 
at 708 n.16. In fact, in State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987), the court held that 
four and half years between arrest and trial did not violate the defendant's right to a 
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speedy trial. Id. at 632. "Four and one-half years between arrest and trial is an 
extraordinary period of time. As in Barker, very little of that time can be attributed to a 
strong excuse." Yet the court found lack of prejudice was a key factor outweighing 
this length of time. 
There is no evidence in the record that defendant's defense was impaired. The 
evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Defendant, however, contends 
that he was prejudiced by the fading memories of the prosecution's witnesses. 
This is not prejudicial to defendant. First of all, the few instances of fading 
memories concerned insignificant facts. Second, if there was prejudice to 
anyone by faded memories, it was to the prosecution, not to defendant. 
Id. " 'When a defendant's [own] actions cause delay in the trial date, the right to a 
speedy trial is temporarily waived by those actions.' " State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 
130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 208 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). "This is true whether or not the reason for the delay is meritorious." 
Ossana, 739 P.2d at 631. "[W]hen a defendant affirmatively agrees to a scheduled 
trial date and offers no subsequent objection to that date, he cannot then turn around 
and count those days leading up to the agreed upon trial date in his determination of 
delay for speedy trial purposes." State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, ^28, 138 P.3d 97 
(citing Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130; State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant had temporarily waived the right to a speedy 
trial when he agreed to postpone trial, filed several continuances, and changed counsel 
twice)). 
10 
State v. Mathis, 319 P.2d 134 (Utah 1957), held that a 'speedy trial' is 
"necessarily a flexible term to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the 
practical exigencies encountered in the handling of the business of the courts." Id. at 
136. In State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985), the defendant, who was charged on 
February 10, 1983, for a burglary committed in August 1979 and was tried in February 
1984, was not denied the right to a speedy trial where there was no showing that the 
delay in bringing the charge against him was intentional or designed to produce an 
advantage for prosecution. Id. at 283-84. 
In Barker, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the difference between the Sixth 
Amendment right to speedy trial and other constitutional rights is that "the deprivation 
of the right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense 
tactic. As the time...[grows] witnesses may become unavailable or their memories 
may fade. ... [D]eprvation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the 
accused's ability to defendant himself." 407 U.S. at 521. 
In the present case, to apply Barker, we first look at the length of the delay. 
Despite Defendant's assertion, any length of time is not presumptively prejudicial. 
Trafny, 799 P.2d at 708-09; cf. Def. Mot. to Dismiss Case No. 065612920, at 3. 
Defendant claims that the delay should run from August 12, 2005 until April 19, 2007, 
totaling 615 days. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Case No. 065612920, at 2). However, under 
Conejo, the delay is actually from August 12, 2005 until November 30, 2005 (minus 
the seven days in October 2005 Defendant was granted a continuance) plus January 
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24, 2007 until February 15, 2007 (from Defendant's first sign of awareness of the 
charge until his assertion of his right to a speedy trial)— totaling 127 days—a fraction 
of the time deemed constitutional in Ossana. 
Like Ossana, the evidence against Appellee is overwhelming—the consistent 
testimony of three officers corroborated by a video recording of Defendant spitting at a 
corrections officer. 
Second, Barker compels the Court to examine the reason for the delay. Here, 
part of the delay was due Appellant's failure to appear at the March 13, 2006 preliminary 
hearing and his unwilliness to work with his assigned public defender after his trial had been 
rescheduled—four months. Another portion of the delay was due to the overburdened 
trial calendar of district court judges—bumping his June 7, 2006 trial date into a 
scheduling conference for August 22, 2006. 
Third, Appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until the day of the trial 
(February 7, 2007), 14 months after Appellant's case was refilled. 
Fourth, Appellant claims prejudice per se via the lengthy period between the 
issuance of the Information and the actual trial on the merits. As stated above, Utah 
courts have consistently held this is insufficient grounds for a successful Speedy Trial 
challenge. 
Under the totality of the circumstances and considering all four Barker factors, 
Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the delay. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's brief fails to marshal the facts in the light most favorable to his 
conviction. Moreover, Appellant's claims of error are not preserved on the record, nor 
doe he claim plain error. Appellant's brief fails to show a meritorious position by 
providing sufficient analysis of the facts to the appropriate case law. This means that 
the court is not obliged to analyze Appellant's claims on the merits and may 
summarily affirm the jury's conviction below. 
Regardless, if the Court proceeds to address the merits of the appeal, the length 
of the delay is not the sole factor in the determination of whether Appellant's speedy 
trial rights were violated. When all four Barker factors are examined in their totality, 
Appellant has failed to establish that the delay caused any prejudicial effect on his 
case. Therefore, this Court should AFFIRM Appellant's conviction and DISMISS 
Appellant's appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on JJL August 2007. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
tfarlies M. Cdpe / 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Clark C. Robinson #153384, 
Appellant acting in Pro Se9 at Utah State Penitentiary, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 
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Deputy District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.... 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 12. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right...to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for 
such an award. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2003) 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall 
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deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent 
of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court 
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
written notice. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the 
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported 
by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
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